The 'paradox of forgiveness' says: to forgive is to forgive a person for a particular culpable wrongdoing, but if the wrongdoing is culpable there is no reason to forgive him/her for it. The author's view is that an anthropology that states that man has only self-regarding desires can never resolve this paradox and make sense of prototypical forgiving. Positively, he argues that the paradox disappears if human nature is ascribed (as, for instance, by Hume) basic other-regarding desires of benevolence. Such benevolent desires have no meaning outside of themselves; they are their own meaning and value. The analysis implies that one cannot justify forgiving by means of reasons, only explain it by means of benevolence. This conclusion can also be put as follows: only nonjustifiable benevolence can justify forgiveness. Jacques Derrida's, Aurel Kolnai's, Charles S. Griswold's, and Leo Zaibert's analyses of forgiveness are explicitly discussed and criticized.
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and one in common with a commissive utterance such as 'I promise not to disturb you any more today'. A person who says 'I forgive you for your deed' does hereby publicly express two psychological states, both a feeling that his resentment has decreased or gone away, and an intention not in the future to blame the wrongdoer for his deed. (That is, there are two kinds of 'illocutionary acts' in play, both an expressive and a commissive act.) The intended ('perlocutionary') effect is that the listeners should understand that these psychological states are quite compatible with the fact that the speaker nonetheless finds the deed blameable, and holds the wrongdoer responsible for it. 6 
Forgiveness and Philosophical Anthropology
The so-called 'paradox of forgiveness' has been given a couple of different formulations (see the next two sections), but I think the essence can best be stated thus:
o to forgive is to forgive a person for a particular culpable wrongdoing, but if the wrongdoing is culpable there is no reason to forgive him for it.
The thesis of this paper is that the paradox -even with respect to unconditional forgiving -disappears as soon as one accepts and thinks through a philosophical anthropology that not only counts with desires for pleasure, aversions to pain, and other self-regarding desires, but ascribes human nature direct other-regarding desires or passions, too. Even though the intensity of the different desires may differ between individuals, human nature has three main kinds of desires wired-in:
1. self-regarding desires 2. benevolent other-regarding desires 3. malevolent other-regarding desires. 7 Put negatively, my view is that an anthropology that states that man has only selfregarding desires can never make sense of forgiving.
8 Benevolent desires (not just benevolent feelings) are necessary for the kind of over-ruling of culpable wrongdoings that constitute forgiving, and malevolence is necessary for the retributive attitude that forgiving publicly proclaims to be gone. (As the term 'malevolent' is used here, to be malevolent towards 3 another person means directly to desire that some of the latter's self-regarding desires will become frustrated in such a way that it hurts; may this other-regarding desire have arisen out of pure sadism, out of a wish to give a villain a fair retributive punishment, or out of some mixture; on the other hand, to try to win a competition and, thereby, frustrate the competitors' desires to win, is normally not a desire to make the latter feel pain and so not a case of malevolence.) 9 One famous place where the mentioned anthropology can be found is David
Hume's A Treatise of Human Nature. He writes:
Beside good and evil, or in other words, pleasure and pain, the direct passions frequently arise from a natural impulse or instinct, which is perfectly unaccountable. We cannot without the greatest absurdity dispute that there is some benevolence, however small, infused into our bosom; some spark of friendship for human kind; some particle of the dove kneaded into our frame, along with the elements of the wolf and serpent (1975: 271 Nietzsche, Freud and the focusing on human self-deception that has followed in their wake, too. However, even though many first-person apprehensions of benevolence may be selfdeceptions, I am sure that they are not completely ubiquitous. In this paper, therefore, I will rest content with arguing that if Hume's anthropology is true, then the paradoxical aura around forgiveness disappears completely. Hume himself, it should be noted, does never discuss forgiveness.
What then is a desire from a first-person perspective? First, it is an intentional phenomenon with, to speak with Searle (1983) , a world-to-mind direction of fit; one wants the world changed in such a way that the desire in the mind becomes satisfied. If you are hungry and want to eat the sandwich in front of you, then you want the world changed in such a way that your felt hunger becomes satisfied. Every so desired object has at least a subjective value, and is in this desire-dependent sense a reason for the desiring person to act in order to satisfy the desire.
Second, desires contain, as do all intentional phenomena, an act-object or state-object distinction, and both the act/state and the object can be classified as being of a certain kind.
Hunger, sexual desiring, and longing for confirmation are different kinds of (self-regarding) intentional states; rice, potatoes, meat, fish, and vegetables are different kinds of intentional objects (for the state of hunger). The intentional object of a benevolent other-regarding desire is the satisfaction of another being's desire; the object of malevolence is a painful frustration (dissatisfaction) of another being's desire. Fifth, most desires come and go and have a temporally intermittent structure; and they seem to be able to be triggered in two different ways, externally and internally. Quite obviously, hunger and sexual desire can come into being because of a sudden external appearance of a certain kind of food or a certain kind of person, but both of them can also first be felt as an intense internal desire that either as yet has found no determinate intentional object at all or has a determinate object that is absent. In these kinds of cases (counter-desires and countering desire-independent reasons disregarded), one has either to start to search for some objects or persons that might be able to satisfy one's desire, or try to come near to the determinate objects that one already desires. This distinction between external and internal triggering applies to benevolence and malevolence, too. Benevolence is often triggered by the mere appearance of a beloved one or a close friend, but there are many people who first have an indeterminate desire to be benevolent towards someone, and then try, for instance, to adopt a child or become members of some community where there are people they can be friendly towards. Similarly, malevolence can be triggered by the appearance of a person who in some 6 way or other has been nasty towards oneself, but it is also a well known fact that people can harbor a general resentment that is intensely seeking for an outlet. Their indeterminate malevolent other-regarding desire is looking for some determinate intentional object in a way similar to the way indeterminate hunger and sexual desire can be searching for some determinate intentional object.
My sixth and last point about desires is the following. Independently of whether the intentional object of one of my desires is my own self (a self-regarding desire) or another person (an other-regarding desire), the desire is always a desire of mine. That is, necessarily when one of my benevolent other-regarding desires is satisfied there are two satisfactions: one in me (be it very pleasurable or just a tiny feeling of satisfaction) and one in the other person. o to forgive is to forgive a person for a particular culpable wrongdoing, and this is possible since a desire to be benevolent can overrule culpability; therefore, benevolence can give rise to forgiveness even where there is no repentance on part of the wrongdoer.
On the account that I have given, one cannot ask someone for an objective reason why he is benevolent. The desire to be benevolent appears as a basic desire in the situation at hand.
Here to ask 'give me a reason why you are so benevolent that you simply forgive him' would be like asking persons questions such as 'give me a reason why you are hungry' and 'give me a reason why you would like to have sex'. In relation to basic desires there are no objective reasons, only purely subjective values and causal explanations. As one cannot justify, only explain, why one is hungry or desires sex, one cannot justify, only explain by means of 7 benevolence, why one is unconditionally forgiving. If I am right that objectively unjustifiable benevolence is the crucial thing in unconditional forgiving, then this fact also places such forgiving outside of contexts of justification; but not outside of human nature.
People who like each other can out of pure benevolence spontaneously give unmerited presents and gifts to each other. Similarly, pure or unconditional forgiving is a spontaneous unmerited present from a wronged person to the wrongdoer. As one author on forgiveness has it:
Pure forgiveness is not an instrumental good, a prudent management technique or a damage limitation exercise; it is an intrinsic good, an end in itself, a pure gift offered with no motive in return (Holloway 2000: 78) .
My analysis fits well with the fact that 'forgiving' linguistically presents itself as a special kind of giving, 'for-giving', but does it fit this common view: "forgiveness is the process of ceasing to feel resentment, indignation or anger against another person for a perceived offense, difference or mistake" (Wikipedia, June, 2008) where conditional forgiveness (forgiveness that requires a change in the wrongdoer) is discussed; first, in order to make the core of my analysis even more clear, some more words about unconditional forgiveness.
Is Unconditional Forgiveness Unintelligible?
The most famous and most radical formulation of the paradox of forgiveness is a sentence of Jacques Derrida condensed into the dictum 'to forgive is to forgive the unforgivable'. He writes: According to the views I have put forward in the first section, Derrrida's message has to be exchanged for the following:
o Forgiveness is thus a contingent natural expression of human benevolence. This fact must move, lucidly, into the daylight of the intelligible.
So far, I have discussed only unconditional (absolute, pure) forgiving, and claimed that it contains no paradox. Several philosophers of forgiveness have taken another route. They agree with Derrida that unconditional forgiving is unintelligible, but, of course, disagree with his acceptance of this presumed unintelligible phenomenon. They reject unconditional forgiveness, and rest content with trying to make philosophical sense of forgiveness that is conditional upon repentance or some other change in the in the mind of the wrongdoer.
Derrida, on the other hand, claims that the possibility of unconditional forgiveness is also a necessary presupposition for the possibility of conditional forgiveness (2001: 34). Taken in abstraction from Derrida, I agree with the last claim. More precisely, I will show that benevolence is as crucial to conditional forgiveness as it is to unconditional forgiveness. 
Conditions on Forgiveness
From a purely logical point of view, conditions on forgiving can be divided into the four different kinds below. One can claim that forgiving requires:
(i) a change in the wronged person
(ii) a change in the wrongdoer (this is conditional forgiving as opposed to unconditional) (iii) changes in both the wronged one and the wrongdoer (iv) something that is external to both the wronged and the wrongdoer.
Let me comment on these requirements one by one.
By definition, all kinds of forgiving requires a change in the wronged person. At first he resents, but by the time of forgiving this resentment should be radically reduced; in the best of cases completely gone. What makes this definitional condition worth speaking of without discussing any details in the change is the fact that there can be insincere forgiving. 14 A person who says 'I forgive you for your deed' does hereby publicly express both a feeling that his resentment is not especially strong and an intention not to blame the wrongdoer anymore.
But such a speech act can be performed even by a speaker who consciously hides strong resentment in his heart, and has no intention whatsoever to stop blaming the wrongdoer that he is pretending to forgive. Insincere forgiving is just as possible as faked emotions and false promises.
(ii)
I will take Aurel Kolnai (1973) as a good representative of the view that a necessary requirement for forgiving is that the wrongdoer has undergone some change of mind since he made his deed. Be it that the wrongdoer afterwards repents, asks for forgiveness, or does something else of a similar kind; Kolnai focuses on repentance. He regards unconditional
forgiving as an illusion that should be rejected, and summarizes the presumed paradox of such forgiveness as follows: "Briefly, [such] forgiveness is either unjustified or pointless" (1973: 99) . It is unjustified in case the deed "is still flourishing, the offence still subsisting: then by 'forgiving' you accept it and thus confirm it and make it worse" (1973: 98); and it is pointless in case "the wrongdoer has suitably annulled and eliminated his offence" (1973: 98-99).
Kolnai's way out of a complete denunciation of forgiving is to make forgiving conditional on repentance or 'metánoia ("Change of Heart") ' (1973: 99) .
According to Kolnai's analysis, forgiveness without a preceding repentance by the wrongdoer is not a forgiving but a condonation (i.e., in spite of morally disapproving an action, one deliberately refrains from all retributive attitudes and responses). Kolnai must mean that if the wrongdoer has repented, then the offence is neither "flourishing" (first horn of the dilemma) nor "annulled" (second horn). But even so, I will argue, repentance cannot be a sufficient reason for forgiving; even conditional forgiving requires something more, namely benevolence.
Since my argument is quite general, let us in the abstract conceive of a wrongdoer that in a culpable way has offended a person, 'the wronged', who does not condone but reacts with indignation and a retributive attitude. In other words, the wronged person starts to harbor malevolent desires towards the wrongdoer. According to my assumed philosophical anthropology, it might happen that one day these malevolent desires simply have melted away in the face of the general human sympathy and benevolence that the wronged one felt for the wrongdoer before the deed; and that the wronged party, out of this re-gained benevolence, unconditionally forgives the wrongdoer. But let us now disregard this possibility, i.e., the wronged person clings to his retributive attitude. However, when he is told that the wrongdoer is sincerely repenting, he starts to reflect on his attitude, and after some time he forgives the wrongdoer. To other people the wronged person says: 'okay, now when he repents I can forgive him'. The question is whether this repentance by itself can make such a difference to the forgiver. Let us see.
Of course, a repentant wrongdoer is from a moral point of view a different kind of person than a non-repentant one, and this difference ought to have some consequences. Think of the difference we make between murder and manslaughter. The difference of mind, which we ascribe to the two kinds of killers, makes us require a less hard punishment for manslaughter than murder. Analogously, the difference between a repentant and a non-repentant wrongdoer has to be taken into account when estimating what degree of blame and punishment we should burden each of them with. In neither the murder/manslaughter case nor the nonrepentant/repentant case, however, should the blame or retributive attitude be allowed to be completely withdrawn. But this is exactly what is allowed to happen in a forgiving. When saying 'I forgive you', the wronged person publicly promises not at all in the future to blame the wrongdoer for his deed; and if the forgiver still harbors some resentment in his heart he 11 should be happy if it vanishes. That is, repentance from the wrongdoer leads naturally to a less hard condemnation from the wronged person, but it cannot by itself lead to forgiving. In order to annul the retributive attitude completely, benevolence is needed. Conditional forgiveness is at bottom conditional benevolence. Benevolence can have many different causes and counter-forces, and it is by no means psychologically odd that repentance by the wrongdoer can make room for benevolence in the wronged person. Obviously, this psychological observation was one reason behind the truly great social innovation that saw the light at the end of the last century, the South African 'Truth and Reconciliation Commission'.
(iii)
In a recent book, Charles L. Griswold (2007) 2007: xv) ."
And at the end of the book he writes:
I hope to have shown that forgiveness is fundamentally an interpersonal process whose success requires actions from both parties. Anything an individual can accomplish here on his or her own regarding forgiveness is less than fully adequate. Consequently, forgiveness should not be understood as a "gift" that may be bestowed at the discretion of the injured party (2007: 212).
Griswold argues that forgiveness has six conditions in relation to the forgiver, six in relation to the wrongdoer, and one that is external to both the forgiver and the wrongdoer, namely that the deed must in principle be forgivable (2007: 59) . I would call the last condition 'logical', and see no reason to comment on it here. According to Griswold, at the moment of forgiving, the forgiver: 1) has to forswear revenge, 2) has moderated his resentment, 3) has to commit himself to let the rest of the resentment go, 4) has "reframed" his mind in relation to the wrongdoer, 5) feels no moral superiority in relation to the wrongdoer, and 6) talks directly to him (2007: 54, 58) . The man to be forgiven, on the other hand, must have: 1) accepted responsibility for the deed, 2) repudiated the deed, 3) expressed regret, 4) expressed a will to become a person that does not inflict injury, 5) shown a first-person understanding of the injury done, and 6) offered a narrative account of how he came to do wrong (2007:49-51) .
When all the thirteen necessary conditions are met, Griswold thinks there is a sufficient reason for forgiving (2007: 58-59) . Let it be clear that he also (rightly) thinks that the wrongdoer never has a right to forgiveness, and that the forgiver never can be compelled to forgive. Forgiveness is always voluntary; the sufficient reason mentioned is a morally sufficient reason in the sense that it makes the corresponding (conditional) forgiving morally praiseworthy (2007: 67-69) . I claim, to the contrary, but in conformance with my remark in relation to Kolnai, that the thirteen conditions can only be a morally sufficient reason to reduce blame, punishment, and a retributive attitude. Since the culpability is still there, something more -or other -than a moral reason is needed in order completely to overrule the culpability. And as far as I can see, the only thing available is benevolence.
Griswold regards his analysis of conditional forgiveness as also showing that such forgiving must be the result of a preceding "interpersonal process," and that, therefore, forgiveness is always "dyadic forgiveness" (2007: 47). 15 That Griswold overstates how much 'dyadicity' there is in forgiving is clear also from the following quotation: "the offender depends on the victim in order to be forgiven, and the victim depends on the offender in order to forgive (2007: 49) ." Here, the logical truth that there can be no forgiving without both an offender and a victim, is mixed up with the intimated (but false) view that both the offender and the victim depends equally on each other in order to get something they want in life. In fact none of them, and especially not the victim, may think he has anything to gain by an act of forgiving.
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Even though Griswold at some length discusses the phenomenon of a general human sympathy, which is intimately connected with benevolence, his analysis of forgiveness does in the end only take self-regarding desires and objective moral reasons into account -not benevolent other-regarding desires. This fact makes him unable to accept the existence of unconditional forgiving, and it makes him cancel the asymmetry between forgiver and forgivee that is there even in conditional forgiving.
(iv)
In the paper "The Paradox of Forgiveness," Leo Zaibert (2009) 14 In summary: "to forgive is to deliberately refuse to punish (2009: 3) ." This applies independently of whether there is repentance or not. However, as seen from (8), the forgiver is assumed to have a believed justificatory reason for his refusal. About this Zaibert is quite explicit: "Forgiveness, like punishment, is the sort of phenomenon which stands in need of justification (2009: 5) ." The justificatory reason found is neither a belief that there is a change in the heart of the wrongdoer, nor a belief that the forgiver's own resentment has disappeared, but a belief that the world would in fact be a worse place if the potential forgiver himself would attempt to enforce some retribution. Relating himself to Jeffrie G. Murphy (Murphy and Hampton 1988: 24) with Hobbes, has always had a certain vogue. It is not without a certain superficial plausibility, and it has naturally been popular both with vicious persons who wanted a philosophical excuse for their own selfishness and with decent people who felt slightly ashamed of their own virtues and wished to be taken for men of the world. One of Butler's great merits is to have pointed out clearly and conclusively the ambiguities of language which make it plausible. As a psychological theory it was killed by Butler; but it still flourishes, I believe, among bookmakers and smart young businessman whose claim to know the world is based on an intimate acquaintance with the shadier side of it. In
Butler's day the theory moved in higher social and intellectual circles, and it had to be treated more seriously than any philosopher would trouble to treat it now. This change is very largely the result of Butler's work; he killed the theory so thoroughly that he sometimes seems to the modern reader to be flogging dead horses. Still, all good fallacies go to America when they die, and rise again as the latest discoveries of the local professors. So it will always be useful to have Butler's refutation at hand (1979: 54-55 
